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Supervisors:  Peter Ward and Susan Klein 
 
Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are voluntary agreements between 
prosecutors and defendants in which the government agrees to suspend prosecution for a 
specified period of time while the defendant is monitored for compliance with certain 
conditions. Though Congress modeled the legislation authorizing federal use of DPAs on 
pretrial diversion programs targeting nonviolent, nonrecidivist drug offenders, the 
Department of Justice today uses DPAs almost exclusively for resolving corporate 
criminal liability. Given the federal government’s emphasis on remedying mass 
incarceration and the collateral consequences of criminal convictions, expanding the 
federal use of DPAs to the class of offenders and offenses for which such agreements 
were intended represents an unexplored opportunity for achieving meaningful criminal 
justice reform.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done.1 
 
  
 U.S. prosecutors, observers have noted, are “arguably the most powerful officials 
in the U.S. criminal justice system.”2 The federal government provides prosecutors 
immense leeway in deciding which offenders to charge, what offenses to charge those 
individuals with, and how to approach plea bargaining and the dismissal of charges.3 In a 
system in which prosecutors are the “real lawmakers,” changing prosecutors’ behavior is 
essential to reducing incarceration rates and racial disparities in sentencing. 4 While many 
vehicles for prosecutorial discretion are bound up in statutory regimes subject to political 
logjam, several non-legislative avenues remain open. Among those is the use of deferred 
prosecution agreements (DPAs) for noncorporate individual defendants.  
 Pursuant to Department of Justice policy, DPAs are used almost exclusively for 
major corporate defendants engaged in white-collar criminal activity—despite being 
available to U.S. Attorneys in a wide variety of circumstances. That practice, in addition 
                                                
1 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (quoted in United States v. Saena Tech 
Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015)). 
2 MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 266 (2015). 
3 Id. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007). 
4 Id. at 266–67; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 505, 506 (2001).  
 2 
to being inconsistent with the historical development and theoretical underpinnings of 
DPAs, is at odds with Congress’s intent in authorizing such agreements in federal law 
enforcement. 
 This Report analyzes the history of deferred prosecution agreements, tracking 
their incorporation into the federal criminal justice system and subsequent use in cases 
involving corporate and noncorporate criminal defendants. It adds to the existing 
literature by assessing the Department of Justice’s use of DPAs in light of the legislative 
history of the agreements’ authorizing legislation and the theoretical support for pretrial 
diversion programs in general. Finally, after reviewing recent literature regarding the role 
federal drug charges play in mass incarceration and the concomitant collateral 
consequences of conviction, this Report discusses the merits of expanding the use of 
DPAs to nonviolent individual criminal offenders as a means to achieve the federal 
government’s stated goals for criminal justice reform. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
 Understanding the issues associated with the Department of Justice’s approach to 
deferred prosecution agreements requires an understanding of the history of DPAs, both 
in general and within the federal government. This chapter summarizes that history, 
explaining both the characteristics of DPAs and their development in the United States.  
 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements Explained 
 
 Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are voluntary agreements between 
prosecutors and defendants in which the government agrees to suspend prosecution for a 
specified period of time while the defendant is monitored for compliance with certain 
conditions.5 If the defendant successfully complies with those conditions, the government 
does not prosecute; if he does not comply, the government does.6 Defendants who 
successfully comply with a DPA do not enter a guilty plea and are thus not “tarred” with 
a criminal conviction.7 Offenders whose indictments are dismissed pursuant to a 
successful deferral are not felons, and, should the individual in question exhibit recidivist 
                                                
5 Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *1; Jeffrey B. Coopersmith & Ashley L. 
Vulin, If You Give a Judge a Case: Judicial Oversight of Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2016, at 36, 36–37.  
6 Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *1; Coopersmith & Vulin, supra note 5, at 
36–37. Defendants are typically required to admit to the alleged criminal conduct in a 
criminal information filed at the same time as the DPA, allowing a prosecutor to insist on 
a guilty plea if the defendant subsequently fails to comply with the requirements of the 
DPA. Coopersmith & Vulin, supra note 5, at 36–37. 
7 Coopersmith & Vulin, supra note 5, at 37.  
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behavior, deferrals are not considered evidence of prior criminal conduct for sentencing 
purposes in later prosecutions.8 
 In the context of corporate criminal cases, the Department of Justice has noted 
that these agreements “occupy an important middle ground between declining 
prosecution and obtaining the conviction.”9 In the federal criminal justice system, 
whether a DPA is offered to a particular defendant depends entirely on the discretion of 
the Department of Justice and its attorneys.10 
 Though often addressed in tandem, DPAs are distinct from nonprosecution 
agreements (NPAs). DPAs are formally filed with the court by the Department of Justice, 
whereas NPAs are more akin to private contracts between prosecutors and alleged 
offenders—they are not filed with the court and are thus not subject to judicial review.11  
 
The Historical Development of DPAs in the United States 
 The first known use of deferred prosecution agreements in the United States dates 
to 1914, when the Chicago Boys’ Court developed DPAs as a way to resolve juvenile 
                                                
8 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, §4A1.2(f) (2015). 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200, 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-
organizations#9-28.200 [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL]. 
10 This Report exclusively addresses the federal government’s use of DPAs. The 
structure and availability of these agreements varies widely between states. 
11 Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t 
Components and U.S. Attorneys 1 n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20/morford- useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf. 
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crime without “branding” offenders as criminal.12 The Judicial Conference formally 
acknowledged the use of such agreements in 1947, emphasizing that “in many cases, 
offenders are capable of correction without prosecution” and that DPAs protected 
offenders from “stigmatiz[ation] by a court record of any kind.”13 The use of DPAs 
expanded beyond juvenile offenders in the 1960s, largely due to the Supreme Court’s 
1962 decision in Robinson v. California.14 In holding that punishing an individual for a 
“status offense,” including drug addiction, was cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment, the Court opened the door to government-run 
compulsory treatment programs.15  
 DPAs were incorporated into the federal system in the 1970s. Near the end of 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency, the Department of Justice developed a bill known as 
the “Crime Reduction Act.”16  Though the Department did not formally share the bill 
with the congressional branch, a version of the proposed legislation was made its way to 
U.S. Representative Abner J. Mikva.17 Representative Mikva subsequently used the 
proposed “Crime Reduction Act” as the basis for two bills; he introduced both in 
                                                
12 JAMES A. INCIARDI ET AL., DRUG CONTROL AND THE COURTS 25 (1996); Benjamin M. 
Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863,1866 (2005). 
13 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROBATION WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (Aug. 21, 1947). 
14 Robertson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Developments in the Law: Alternatives 
to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1902–03 (1998).  
15 Robertson, 370 U.S. at 665–66; Developments in the Law, supra note 14, at 1903.  
16 ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE 
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at 12 (1980).  
17 Id. 
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November 1969.18 Of those, the “Pretrial Crime Reduction Act” addressed the need for 
speedy trials and included an exclusion analogous to what would become § 3161(h)(2).19  
 Although Representative Mikva’s proposed legislation was unsuccessful, it was 
followed by speedy trial legislation introduced by Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. in June 
1970.20 That legislation contained three titles, the first of which established time limits 
for criminal trials.21  Though the first iteration of the bill was unsuccessful, it was 
introduced again in February 1971.22 Following hearings held by the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, the bill was reported to the full Senate Judiciary 
Committee, where it died.23 In 1973, the subcommittee bill was reintroduced by Senator 
                                                
18 Id. 
19 Id.; see also United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *10 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 21, 2015). Representative Mikva’s introduction of the Pretrial Crime Reduction Act 
coincided with the Nixon administration’s embrace of “preventative detention” as a 
means to control crime by defendants on pretrial release. PARTRIDGE, supra note 16, at 
13; see also ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: 
THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 157 (2016) (noting that preventive 
detention, which involved detaining suspects without bail for up to two months, was 
meant to “ensure that accused criminals were behind bars and thus unable to possibly 
commit crime”). Representative Mikva viewed speedy trial guarantees as an alternate, 
better solution that “avoid[ed] the repugnant, and probably unconstitutional, alternative of 
preventive detention.” 115 CONG. REC. 34,335 (1969); PARTRIDGE, supra note 16, at 13. 
20 PARTRIDGE, supra note 16, at 13. Senator Ervin did not characterize his bill as a 
revision of Representative Mikva’s, but observers considered the “common heritage” of 
the bills “unmistakable.” Id. at 14. 
21 Id. at 14.  
22 Id. at 15. 
23 Id. 
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Ervin; that version was reported to the full committee in spring 1974.24 The Judiciary 
Committee reported an amended version of the bill to the Senate.25  
  The Senate-passed bill was considered in the House of Representatives by the 
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, which made several amendments.26 
Those amendments were joined by further changes added by the full Judiciary 
Committee, which reported the bill to the House on December 20, 1974.27 Several 
amendments were made on the House floor, but the bill was passed and transmitted to the 
Senate.28 Following efforts to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions 
of the legislation, the bill was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on January 3, 
1975.29  
 Today, federal prosecutors are authorized to use DPAs pursuant to the same 
language adopted in 1975: the provision of the Speedy Trial Act that excludes from the 
speedy trial calculation “[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by 
the attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with 
the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his 
good conduct.”30  This provision allows prosecutors to file a criminal information, 
                                                
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 15–16. 
29 Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5404.  
30 28 U.S.C. § 316(h)(2) (2010). The Speedy Trial Act “establishes time limits for 
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“thereby obtaining the benefit of the pending criminal charge and potential court 
supervision of the defendant,” without immediately proceeding to trial.31 
 
Congress’s Intent in Authorizing Federal Prosecutors’ Use of DPAs 
 The Speedy Trial Act’s legislative history makes clear that DPAs were “originally 
intended to give prosecutors the ability to defer prosecution of individuals charged with 
certain non-violent criminal offenses to encourage rehabilitation.”32 Indeed, a review of 
the Act’s history “shows just how far the use of Section 3161(h)(2) to defer the 
prosecution of corporations departs from what Congress intended” when it first 
authorized deferred prosecution agreements in the federal context.33 
 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
  
 As noted above, both Representative Mikva’s proposed legislation and the bill 
introduced by Senator Ervin included speedy trial exclusions for any “period of delay 
during which prosecution is deferred by the U.S. Attorney pursuant to written agreement 
                                                                                                                                            
rushing defendants to trial without adequate time to prepare, provides a minimum time 
period during which trial may not commence. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 628(A), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-
resource-manual-628-speedy-trial-act-1974 [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL]. 
31 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *10 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015); 
see also CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 30, at 628(A) (explaining the Act’s 
requirement that a trial commence within seventy days from either (1) the date the 
information or indictment was filed or (2) the date the defendant appears before an officer 
of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(c)(1) (2010). 
32 Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *10.  
33 Id. at *21.  
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with the defendant for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good 
conduct.”34 This language is virtually identical to that found in § 3161(h)(2).35 The 
legislative history of the Act makes clear that the deferred prosecution exclusion was 
specifically designed to allow for “the deferral of prosecution on the condition of good 
behavior,” especially in cases involving first-time noncorporate criminal defendants.36 
The provision was “intended to encourage practices that had been ongoing in certain 
courts,” as made clear by the fact that the committee report accompanying the bill 
explicitly linked § 3161(h)(2) to pretrial diversion programs in Washington, D.C. and 
New York City.37 Those programs, known as Project Crossroads and the Manhattan 
Court Employment Project, respectively, were deemed “quite successful” by the authors 
of the committee report.38 
PROJECT CROSSROADS 
  
 Project Crossroads was an initiative focused on providing pretrial intervention 
alternatives for “youthful first-time offenders.”39 Created in 1967, the project involved a 
                                                
34 PARTRIDGE, supra note 16, at 281, 288. Excluding cross-references, the bills 
introduced by Representatives Mikva and Ervin were identical. Id. at 5.  
35 The final version of the legislation included a requirement that the agreement be 
reached “with the approval of the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 316(h)(2) (2010). While much has 
been made of that addition, see, for example, Coopersmith & Vulin, supra note 5, at 36, 
judicial oversight of deferred prosecution agreements is outside the scope of this Report. 
36 S. REP. NO. 93-1021, at 37, reprinted in PARTRIDGE, supra note 16, at 117.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *21 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015); 
ROBERTA ROVNER–PIECZENIK, NAT'L COMM. FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH, U.S. DEP'T OF 
 10 
ninety-day program of counseling, job placement, job training, and remedial education.40 
Participants who successfully completed the program were rewarded with nol–pros, or 
the discontinuation of their prosecution.41 In addition to the reduction of costs associated 
with prosecution, detention, trial, and incarceration, the program was meant to “alter[] the 
image of the courts in the eyes of the accused and the community,” allowing the criminal 
justice system to “be viewed as an institution interested in the individual and oriented 
toward the treatment approach to crime prevention.”42 By allowing participants “an 
avenue through which to gain a foothold in the legitimate opportunity structure of 
society,” the program hoped to mitigate the negative byproducts of criminal convictions 
and benefit the community at large.43 
MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT  
  
 The Manhattan Court Employment Project, meanwhile, was an “experimental, 
alternative disposition” program originally sponsored by the Vera Institute of Justice and 
funded by the Department of Labor that began operations in 1967.44 Based on the idea 
that “prolonged exposure to the criminal justice system is detrimental to the rehabilitation 
                                                                                                                                            
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PROJECT CROSSROADS AS PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION: A 
PROGRAM EVALUATION 1 (1970). 
40 ROVNER–PIECZENIK, supra note 39, at 1. 
41 Id. at 2. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *22; John P. Richert, The Court Employment 
Project in New York, 61 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 191, 191 (1975). 
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of the offender,”45 the program was designed to create alternatives to prison or probation 
for juvenile offenders.46  
 At its inception, participation in the program was limited to offenders age sixteen 
through forty-five who (1) were unemployed or underemployed, (2) were residents of 
New York City with a verifiable address, (3) were not charged with a mere “violation” or 
“minor offense,” (4) were not charged with homicide, rape, kidnapping, or arson, (5) 
were not drug addicts or alcoholics, though individuals charged with possession of 
narcotics were considered, and who (6) did not have a prison record of more than one 
year.47 The program, working alongside the District Attorney’s office, engaged with 
defendants immediately after their arrest, providing support and training for ninety 
days.48 If the defendant cooperated with and successfully completed the program, the 
Project recommended to the prosecutor that charges be dismissed.49 By the Project’s third 
year in operation, over 61% of participants successfully participated in the program, 
earning dismissals of all charges.50 The program later transitioned to CASES, a 
multifaceted organization with operations in Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx, and 
                                                
45 Richert, supra note 44, at 191.  
46 Programs: Court Employment Project, CASES, 
http://www.cases.org/programs/youth/cep.php. 
47 Richert, supra note 44, at 192. 
48 VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT OF THE VERA 
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT 1967–1970 at 2 (1970), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-manhattan-court-
employment-project.pdf 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 39. 
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Queens,51 where it exists today as an alternative-to-incarceration program for individuals 
aged sixteen through twenty-four facing felony charges.52  
  
                                                
51 Richert, supra note 44, at 191. 
52 Programs: Court Employment Project, CASES, 
http://www.cases.org/programs/youth/cep.php. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CURRENT USE OF DPAS BY FEDERAL 
PROSECUTORS 
 
  
 Today, the vast majority of DPAs entered into by federal prosecutors are used to 
resolve criminal investigations into corporate wrongdoing, particularly in the financial 
sector. This is true despite the fact that the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) existing 
standards governing the use of DPAs permits U.S. Attorneys to use the agreements with 
certain noncorporate individual criminal defendants. This Chapter summarizes those 
standards and examines the DOJ’s use of DPAs in two distinct populations: noncorporate 
and corporate defendants.  
 
Existing DOJ Standards Governing the Use of DPAs 
  
 The Department of Justice first promulgated federal standards for deferred 
prosecution agreements in 1997, when it incorporated the mechanism into its manual for 
U.S. Attorneys throughout the country.53 In doing so, the Department identified three 
purposes served by the use of DPAs: preventing future criminal activity among certain 
offenders, saving prosecutive and judicial resources for concentration on major cases, and 
providing a vehicle for community- and victim-centered restitution.54  
 Today, federal prosecutors may—at their discretion—reach DPAs and other 
pretrial diversion agreements with offenders who (1) do not have two or more prior 
                                                
53 Greenblum, supra note 12, at 1867; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATT’YS MANUAL § 9-
22.010 (1997). 
54 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 9-22.010. 
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felony convictions, (2) are not public officials or former public officials accused of an 
offense arising out of an alleged violation of a public trust, and (3) are not accused of an 
offense related to national security of foreign affairs.55 Supervision pursuant to a DPA is 
generally limited to eighteen months56 and may include employment, counseling, 
education, job training, psychiatric care, or other forms of restitution or community 
service.57 
 The Department of Justice’s guidelines for the use of DPAs “reflect the prevailing 
view that eligibility for diversion should be limited to certain categories of offenders and 
offenses.”58 U.S. Attorneys are not authorized to divert individuals who have two or more 
prior felony convictions, in keeping with the general approach that DPAs are most 
appropriate for individuals with minimal criminal histories,59 and the Department’s 
emphasis on saving resources for “concentration on major cases” implies that such 
diversion should not be used in cases involving major, violent crimes.60  
 
Comparing DPA Usage for Corporate and Noncorporate Defendants 
  
 Despite Congress’s intent in authorizing deferred prosecution agreements and the 
Department of Justice’s own provisions guiding their use, federal prosecutors rarely offer 
                                                
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 30, at §§ 712(E)–(F).  
58 David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the 
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1305 (2013). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
 15 
deferred prosecution agreements to noncorporate criminal defendants.61 According to 
Department of Justice statistics for fiscal year 2012, the most recent year for which data 
is available, pretrial diversions for individual defendants accounted for less than 1% of 
the reasons Assistant U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute.62 The comparative rarity of 
noncorporate individual DPA agreements has persisted for years: in 2002, only 1.5% 
percent of all federal cases not prosecuted were deferred.63 The Department of Justice 
does not publish data regarding the use of DPAs for noncorporate individual criminal 
defendants, but existing data suggests that a maximum of 6.1% of all DPAs and NPAs 
entered into by the Department’s Criminal Division could involve such agreements.64  
 The federal government has recently begun expanding its corporate criminal 
liability guidance to include officers and executives of targeted corporations. In 
September 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates issued a memorandum, 
known as the Yates Memo, stating that companies would only receive cooperation credit 
if they provided the Department “all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible 
                                                
61 Id. at 1306; see also U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 9-22.010. 
62 See MARK MOTIVANS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES 2 tbl.2.3 (2015), at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf; see also United States v. Saena Tech 
Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *25 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2015). 
63 Greenblum, supra note 12, at 1866 (2005); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 30–31 tbl.2.4 (2002).  
64 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO 
BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT 
SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 35 tbl. 3 (2009) (showing that of the forty-nine DPAs 
and NPAs entered into by the Department of Justice’s criminal division, only three were 
not entered into by the fraud, asset forfeiture, Enron Task Force, Obscenity Prosecution 
Task Force, or public integrity sections) [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON CORPORATE 
CRIME]. 
 16 
for the misconduct.”65 Shortly thereafter, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
entered into a DPA with an individual, agreeing to defer Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
charge against the individual for three years in recognition of his cooperation during the 
government’s investigation into his employer’s wrongdoing.66 However, the Yates Memo 
and its resultant policy shift specifically target employees and officers of corporate 
wrongdoers. Despite the availability of DPAs for noncorporate criminal defendants, 
prosecutors’ use of those agreements for such defendants remains so sporadic as to be 
considered a nullity.  
 
DPAS AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
  
 Traditionally, federal efforts to resolve criminal charges against corporations were 
closely aligned with the three foundational options of the U.S. criminal justice system: 
decline prosecution, prosecute and engage in successful plea-bargaining, or prosecute and 
proceed to trial.67 The DOJ’s reliance on that triad continued through the end of the 
twentieth century, as evidenced by a 1999 memorandum by then-Deputy Attorney 
                                                
65 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.  
66 Lily Becker, “The Carrot and the Stick: The SEC’s First Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement with an Individual in an FCPA Case,” ORRICK SEC. LITIG., INVESTIGATIONS & 
ENFORCEMENT BLOG, Feb. 22, 2016, http://blogs.orrick.com/securities-
litigation/2016/02/22/the-carrot-and-the-stick-the-secs-first-deferred-prosecution-
agreement-with-an-individual-in-an-fcpa-case/.  
67 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal 
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and 
Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 544 (2015); Mike Koehler, Measuring the 
Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 500 (2015); 
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General Eric Holder.68 That document, which was titled Bringing Criminal Charges 
Against Corporations and which is now known as the Holder Memo, was intended to 
serve as a guide for prosecutors determining whether to charge a corporation with a 
violation of criminal law.69 Though it provided eight factors for prosecutors to consider 
when making charging decisions involving corporations, the memorandum did not 
reference DPAs or NPAs.70  
 Less than one year later, the collapse of the Enron Corporation and associated 
investigation into accounting firm Arthur Andersen highlighted the need for a revised 
approach to corporate criminal liability.71 The Department of Justice brought criminal 
charges against Arthur Andersen in 2002, leading to a jury trial and conviction for 
                                                
68 Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 549; Koehler, supra note 67, at 500; 
Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. 
Attorneys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging- corps.pdf. 
69 Lauren Giudice, Note, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV. 347, 362 (2011). 
70 Among the eight factors identified in the Holder Memo was the company in question’s 
willingness to waive the attorney-client and work-product privileges. Peter Spivack & 
Sujit Raman, Essay, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 2008 ANN. SURVEY WHITE COLLAR CRIME 159, 167. The 
defense bar and certain courts harshly criticized prosecutors’ use of that factor, which 
was encouraged in subsequent Department memoranda. Id. at 167–69. In 2006, then-
Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty issued a memorandum that superseded the 
Thompson Memo and strictly limited efforts to secure the waivers described herein. Id. at 
170. 
71 See Koehler, supra note 67, at 501–02 (identifying the “Arthur Anderson effect” as a 
phenomenon in which “criminal charges alone, and certainly criminal convictions, [can] 
be the death sentence of a business organization”).  
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obstruction of justice.72 The company suffered myriad collateral consequences—
including the loss of its certified public accounting license—as a result of the 
prosecution, causing it to functionally go out of business and impacting thousands of 
jobs, shareholders, and other actors.73 All this occurred despite the Supreme Court’s 2005 
reversal of Arthur Andersen’s criminal conviction.74 
 In response to the challenge of “aggressively root[ing] out corporate fraud while 
remaining sensitive to the considerable collateral consequences of moving criminally 
against an entire entity,” then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson published 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, now known as the 
Thompson Memo.75 That document, unlike the Holder Memo, provided that “pretrial 
diversion [could] be considered in the course of the government’s investigation.”76 In 
doing so, the Thompson Memo “effectively open[ed] the door” to the federal 
government’s use of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements to resolve 
                                                
72 Jonathan Weil & Alexei Barrionuevo, “Arthur Andersen is Convicted on Obstruction-
of-Justice Count,” WALL STREET J. (June 16, 2002 11:28 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023469305374958120.   
73 Giudice, supra note 69, at 363 (2011); James Titcomb, “Arthur Andersen Returns 12 
Years After Enron Scandal,” TELEGRAPH (Sept. 2, 2014 11:22 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11069713/Arthur-
Andersen-returns-12-years-after-Enron-scandal.html. 
74 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).  
75 Spivack & Raman, supra note 70, at 166.  
76 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department 
Components and U.S. Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations 6 (Jan. 20, 2003), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/
2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Koehler, supra note 67, at 
503. 
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corporate criminal liability, which had theretofore remained largely unexplored.77 
Response to the Thompson Memo was swift: following its promulgation, the federal 
government’s use of DPAs and NPAs “exploded.”78  
 The use of DPAs and NPAs to resolve federal corporate criminal investigations 
was “further entrenched” in 2008, when then-Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip 
promulgated revised principles for federal prosecution of business organizations that, for 
the first time, were incorporated into the Department of Justice’s U.S. Attorney’s 
Manual.79 The Filip Memo addressed the use of NPAs and DPAs in detail, noting that 
such agreements were especially appropriate “where the collateral consequences of a 
corporate conviction for innocent third parties would be significant.”80 
                                                
77 Scott A. Resnik & Keir N. Dougall, “The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements,” 
N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 18, 2006), 
https://kattenlaw.com/files/21834_The_Rise_of_Deferred_Prosecution_Agreements.pdf; 
see also Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The 
Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 14 (2006) 
(explaining that there were no pre-trial agreements in 1999 and that only four were 
reached between the publication of the Holder and Thompson Memos); see also Koehler, 
supra note 67, at 503. 
78 Finder & McConnell, supra note 77, at 15–17 (characterizing the Thompson Memo as 
a “clear mandate that pre-trial diversion was an efficient and proper way to reward 
corporate defendants who agreed to cooperate in certain circumstances); see also Spivack 
& Raman, supra note 70, at 166–67 (“[T]he number of executed DPAs and NPAs has 
burgeoned since the publication of the Thompson Memo.”).   
79 Koehler, supra note 67, at 507; Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., to 
Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys on Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations 1 (Aug. 28, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-
08282008.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memo]. 
80 Filip Memo, supra note 79, at 18.  
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 Today, the federal government’s use of corporate deferred prosecution and 
nonprosecution agreements is widespread.81 As of January 2015, federal prosecutors had 
entered into a total of 308 DPAs with companies since 2000.82 More than half of those 
agreements were entered into after 2009,83 and the Department of Justice and Securities 
and Exchange Commission entered into 100 corporate NDAs and DPAs in 2015 alone.84 
 
Figure 1: Annual Number of Corporate DPAs and NPAs (1993–2009)85  
 
                                                
81 See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 562 (summarizing the authors’ effort to 
identify and catalog all NPAs, DPAs and plea agreements entered into by public 
corporations between 1997 and 2011 and noting that, of the 486 agreements identified, 
157 were NPAs or DPAs).  
82 Gordon Bourjaily, DPA DOA: How and Why Congress Should Bar the Use of 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 52 
HARV. J. LEGIS. 543, 546–47 (2015). 
83 Id. 
84 GIBSON DUNN, YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 
(NPAS) AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (DPAS) 1 (2016), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2015-Year-End-Update-Corporate-Non-
Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx.  
85 GAO REPORT ON CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 64, at 14 fig.2.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REFORM 
 
  
 In recent years, public discourse has begun to emphasize the characteristics and 
failings of the criminal justice system, particularly with respect to overincarceration and 
the debilitating collateral consequences of criminal convictions. Such discussion has been 
seen at the highest levels of the federal government. President Barack Obama has said 
that “[m]ass incarceration makes our country worse off,” acknowledging that the United 
States has “locked up more and more nonviolent drug offenders than ever before” and 
that “[i]n far too many cases, the punishment simply does not fit the crime.”86 Former 
Attorney General Eric Holder, prior to his departure, noted that “our system has 
perpetuated a destructive cycle of poverty, criminality, and incarceration that has trapped 
countless people and weakened entire communities—particularly communities of 
color.”87  
 This Chapter explores the themes identified above, explaining both (1) the issues 
of mass incarceration, the rising cost of operating the federal prison system, and the 
collateral consequences of criminal convictions, and (2) the racial contours associated 
with each of those phenomena.  
                                                
86 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference (July 
14, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-
naacp-conference. 
87 Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., One Year After Launching Key Sentencing Reforms, 
Attorney General Holder Announces First Drop in Federal Prison Population in More 
Than Three Decades (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/one–year–after–
launching–key–setencing–reforms–attorney–general–holder–annouces–first–drop–0.  
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Mass Incarceration 
  
 As of October 2015, the incarceration rate in America was the second highest in 
the world.88 Despite representing only 4.4% of the world’s population, the United States 
houses more than 20% of the world’s prisoners.89 This phenomenon is largely a recent 
development: between 1980 and 2000, the number of incarcerated persons in America 
grew from approximately 300,000 to over two million.90 These numbers, when combined 
with data showing that black men have the highest imprisonment rate in every age 
group,91 have led scholars to condemn the U.S. criminal justice apparatus as a caste 
system analogous to racial segregation in the post-Reconstruction South.92 
 Violent crime is not responsible for this phenomenon, even when the analysis is 
limited to those convicted of felonies.93 Rather, “convictions for drug offenses are the 
                                                
88 ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2 (2016).  
89 See id. at 2, 5 & tbl.2 (showing that the global prison population is approximately 
10.35 million and that the U.S. prison population is 2,217,500).  
90 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 60 (2010).  
91 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., PRISONERS IN 2014 at 15 (2015). 
92 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 2, at 2 (“The carceral state . . . has been cleaving off wide 
swaths of people in the United States from the promise of the American Dream or 
‘American Creed’—the faith that everyone has an inalienable right to freedom, justice, 
and equal opportunities to get ahead, and that everyone stands equal before the law.”); 
see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 90.  
93 ALEXANDER, supra note 90, at 101–02 (explaining that “violent crime rates have 
fluctuated over the years and bear little relationship to incarceration rates—which have 
soared during the past three decades regardless of whether violent crime was going up or 
down”). Almost one out of every three people in the United States serving prison time for 
a drug offense is held in the federal prison system. Ryan King et al., How to Reduce the 
Federal Prison Population, URBAN INST., http://webapp.urban.org/reducing-federal-
mass-incarceration/.  
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single most important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates.”94 This is especially 
true in federal prisons, where half of males (50%) and more than half of females (59%) 
are serving time for drug offenses.95  
 Moreover, while the majority of illegal drug users and dealers are white, three-
fourths of individuals serving time for drug offenses are black or Latino.96 This disparity 
cannot be explained by the rates of drug crime among different racial groups.97 
 
The Cost of the Federal Prison System 
  
 The Department of Justice itself has noted that addressing the enormous cost 
pressures created by the mass incarceration phenomenon described above should be one 
of the government’s most pressing priorities.98 In fiscal year 2000, the budget for the 
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) totaled approximately $3.8 billion, accounting for 18% 
of the Department of Justice’s discretionary budget.99 In fiscal year 2014, in comparison, 
the BOP’s budget reached $6.9 billion, accounting for 25% of the Department of 
                                                
94 ALEXANDER, supra note 90, at 60.  
95 CARSON, supra note 91, at 1.  
96 ALEXANDER, supra note 90, at 98. 
97 Id. at 99 (summarizing data showing that whites comprise the vast majority of drug 
users, despite the fact that blacks are incarcerated at significantly higher rates). 
98 See Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, to Att’y Gen. and 
Deputy Att'y Gen. on Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the 
Department of Justice (Nov. 10, 2014), https://oig.justice.gov/challenges/2014.htm 
[hereinafter Horowtiz Memorandum].  
99 Id. 
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Justice’s discretionary budget.100 That growth rate was nearly twice the rate of budget 
growth in the rest of the Department of Justice.101 These ballooning costs are expected to 
continue largely unabated: the Department’s fiscal year 2015 budget request for the 
Bureau of Prisons reflects a 0.5% increase from the funding it received in fiscal year 
2014.102  
 The enormous cost of maintaining the federal prison system in its current, bloated 
form has a direct impact on the Department of Justice’s ability to pursue its other 
priorities.103 The Department’s own inspector general noted in 2014 that the continued 
growth in the cost of operating and maintaining the federal prison system “result[s] in 
less funding being available for the Department’s other critical law enforcement 
missions” and that “federal prison spending continues to impact the Department’s ability 
to make other public safety investments.”104  
 As a result, the Department has highlighted the need to “better utilize programs 
that can assist in prison population management, particularly existing programs and 
policies that Congress has already authorized.”105 As statisticians have noted, reducing 
                                                
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 NANCY LA VIGNE & JULIE SAMUELS, URBAN INST., THE GROWTH & INCREASING 
COST OF THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM: DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 2 (2012). 
104 Horowitz Memorandum, supra note 98.  
105 Horowitz Memorandum, supra note 98. 
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the number of drug offenders committed to federal prison would “reduce the long-term 
projections and cost for the system.”106 
 
The Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions 
  
 Mass incarceration, its racial contours, and its associated costs are all the more 
concerning when viewed alongside the development of the “eternal criminal record.” 
Given the broad swath of collateral consequences associated with conviction, the 
explosion of incarceration in America has a direct impact on millions more lives than one 
might initially imagine. 107 Most ex-felons are subjected to various forms of what scholars 
have termed “civil death”: they face discrimination in housing and employment, as well 
as lifetime bans on voting, certain types of professional employment, and jury service.108 
Those effects, though significant, barely scrape the surface of what confronts convicted 
offenders: recent data suggests there are over 44,000 collateral consequences of criminal 
conviction.109   
                                                
106 LA VIGNE & SAMUELS, supra note 103, at 6; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
BUREAU OF PRISONS: INFORMATION ON EFFORTS AND POTENTIAL OPTIONS TO SAVE 
COSTS 48 (2014). 
107 GOTTSCHALK, supra 2, at 1.  
108 Id. at 242.  
109 National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC), AM. BAR 
ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/criminal_justice/annual14_Barriers_
Reentry.authcheckdam.pdf.  
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 Approximately twenty million Americans have felony convictions; it follows, 
then, that at least as many have criminal records.110 Those records, though originally 
intended to facilitate the efficient operation of the criminal justice system, today function 
as the one of the most serious consequences of being arrested or convicted.111 Criminal 
records last forever, and the combination of mass incarceration and the “eternal criminal 
record” has, especially in recent years, led to the “branding” of people with criminal 
records as second-class citizens.112 Such stratification removes from prior offenders 
“many of the things associated with forging healthy identities and desisting from crime 
over the long run,” thereby creating “condemnation scripts” that make it exponentially 
harder for former offenders to establish the employment, relationships, and communities 
necessary to avoid recidivism.113 As Michelle Alexander wrote in The New Crow, “As a 
criminal, you have scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, than a black man 
living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We have not ended racial cast in America; 
we have merely redesigned it.”114 
 
  
                                                
110 JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 1 (2015).  
111 Id. at 1, 4. 
112 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 2, at 256 (describing the exclusion and stigmatization 
of those with felony convictions in the “prison beyond the prison”).  
113 Id. at 256–57.  
114 ALEXANDER, supra note 90, at 2. 
 27 
CHAPTER 4: A PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE USE OF DPAS 
  
 Given Congress’s intent in authorizing the use of deferred prosecution agreements 
by federal prosecutors, the existence of Department of Justice Standards to guide 
prosecutors in realizing Congress’s intent, and the need for criminal justice reform 
identified in the previous chapter, expanding the use of deferred prosecution agreements 
to cases involving noncorporate criminal defendants may be advisable. This chapter 
evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of that proposition.  
 
Advantages of Expanding the Federal Government’s Use of DPAs 
  
 As discussed above, deferred prosecution agreements were originally used to 
resolve prosecution against juvenile offenders or individuals facing charges for 
nonviolent offenses.115 That use aligned with the intent of prosecutors, who used such 
agreements “as a way to impede future criminal conduct without saddling defendants 
with the scarlet mark of a criminal charge.”116  
 By limiting the use of DPAs to cases involving nonviolent offenses, including 
first-time drug possession charges and certain types of theft, federal prosecutors would be 
able to reap the utilitarian rewards of avoiding prosecution while achieving some measure 
                                                
115 See infra ch. 1; see also Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Ray of 
Hope or Guilty Plea by Another Name?, CHAMPION, Oct. 2006, at 12, 13; Candance 
Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass 
of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 4 (2008). 
116 Kristie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the 
Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 642 
(2014).  
 28 
of the rehabilitative and deterrent benefits engrained within the criminal justice system.117 
Specifically, DPAs provide offenders an opportunity to “pay” for their crimes and reenter 
society absent the collateral consequences of felony convictions discussed above.118 
Because they guarantee prosecution if the terms of the agreement are breached, DPAs 
achieve many of the deterrent benefits associated with criminal convictions and 
sentencing.119 And because they avoid criminal trials and sentencing hearings, DPAs 
decrease the burden on prosecutors and judges.120 
 The use of DPAs for noncorporate defendants can thus be considered a utilitarian 
approach to the problems discussed earlier in this chapter.121 In the noncorporate context, 
DPAs are available for less serious criminal charges in which “the societal benefits of 
prosecution”—achieving maximum deterrent effect and highlighting retribution as a 
primary motivator of punishment—“may be outweighed by the costs to the defendant.”122 
Using DPAs for nonviolent, nonrecidivist offenders would “reserve[] criminal 
prosecution for more serious crimes and defendants who are repeat violators.”123 Cutting 
admission to federal prison for drug trafficking offenses would reduce the federal prison 
                                                
117 Id. at 643 (explaining that “utilizing deferred prosecution agreements in their original 
capacity” allows prosecutors to facilitate the offender’s rehabilitation and reintegration, 
avoid the collateral consequences of criminal charges and convictions, deter future 
participation in criminal conduct, and reduce docket congestion in the criminal justice 
system).  
118 Xian, supra note 116, at 643; see supra pp. 25–26. 
119 Xian, supra note 116, at 643. 
120 Id. at 644.  
121 See Uhlmann, supra note 59, at 1305 (2013) (characterizing the theoretical basis for 
pretrial diversion as utilitarian).  
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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population significantly, and doing so through the use of DPAs—given the Department 
of Justice’s existing restrictions on the classes of offenses and offenders who are eligible 
for such agreements— would not require leaving so-called “dangerous” offenders on the 
streets. 124 As of 2012, more than a third (35%) of drug offenders in federal prison had 
either no or minimal criminal history at the time they were sentenced.125 
 More fundamentally, expanding the actual use of DPAs to the extent allowed by 
existing Department of Justice standards would be in keeping with the Department’s 
stated support for “programs that provide alternatives to incarceration, coupled with 
treatment and supervision, in an attempt to reduce recidivism.”126 Such a policy change 
would contribute to the federal government’s stated goal of reducing excessive 
incarceration, especially in the drug context, but would not require dramatic regulatory or 
legislative changes.  
 
Disadvantages of Expanding the Federal Government’s Use of DPAs 
  
 As demonstrated in the context of white collar crime, deferred prosecution 
agreements are not free from criticism. This section examines two of the most prominent 
criticisms lobbed at these types of agreements: the dangers of unchecked prosecutorial 
discretion and the impact of DPAs on the rule of law.  
                                                
124 King, supra note 93. 
125 SAM TAXY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG OFFENDERS IN FEDERAL PRISON: 
ESTIMATES OF CHARACTERISTICS BASED ON LINKED DATA 4 (2014). 
126 Horowitz Memorandum, supra note 98. 
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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
  
 Critics of DPAs have argued that such agreements enhance preexisting problems 
associated with prosecutorial discretion.127 This is true, critics allege, because the use of 
DPAs allows prosecutors to resolve criminal matters before an alleged offender is even 
indicted.128 As such, the negotiation of DPAs takes place outside of “all but the most 
minimal judicial and public oversight,” and prosecutors may be able to exploit their 
considerable leverage to coerce offenders into accepting agreements even when the 
government would not otherwise be able to secure a conviction.129  
 The perils of unbridled prosecutorial discretion, particularly in the context of drug 
offenses, are impossible to ignore.130 But while it is true that prosecutors and judges have 
“tended to use their discretion . . . to lean in a more punitive direction,” the wide latitude 
they enjoy also gives them the ability to “shift now and embrace alternatives to 
incarceration.131 Prosecutors, as “individuals serving on the front lines of the criminal 
justice system,” have the unique ability to “choose a less punitive path” without 
necessitating comprehensive sentencing reform requiring statutory changes.132 Federal 
prosecutors, merely by using the standards already promulgated by the Department of 
Justice with respect to deferred prosecution agreements, could play a key role in lowering 
                                                
127 Bourjaily, supra note 82, at 543. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See generally DAVIS, supra note 3.  
131 GOTTSCHALK, supra note 2, at 264. 
132 Id. 
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incarceration rates and, given the disparities detailed in the previous chapter, reducing 
racial stratification.133 
 
THE RULE OF LAW 
  
 Critics of DPAs also allege that the use of such agreements undermines public 
faith in the rule of law.134 In the context of corporate criminal liability, this argument 
relies on the public’s perception of corporate DPAs as “sweetheart deals” given only to 
companies that are considered “too big to jail.”135 The result, scholars have explained, is 
that “the law ceases to communicate social values.”136  
 This argument is less persuasive, however, in the context of nonviolent criminal 
offenses by nonrecidivist offenders. In those situations, leaders throughout the federal 
government have called for new approaches to prosecution and sentencing.137 Those 
leaders have found broad support in the general public,138 and that support exists in both 
liberal and conservative camps.139 
                                                
133 Id. at 267; see supra pp. 23–26.  
134 Bourjaily, supra note 82, at 543. See, e.g., Janet Novack, FORBES, “Club Fed, 
Deferred” (Aug. 24, 2005 8:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/24/kpmg-taxes-
deferred-cz_jn_0824beltway.html (listing KPMG, American International Group, 
Monsanto, Computer Associates International Bristol-Myers Squibb, Time Warner, 
Merrill Lynch, Royal Dutch Petroleum, PNC Financial Services Group, and AmSouth 
Bancorp as the beneficiaries of deferred prosecution and noting that many have called 
such agreements “too soft on corporations”).  
135 Bourjaily, supra note 82, at 544. 
136 Id. at 544. 
137 See supra p. 21. 
138 See Kevin Ring, “Is Congress Too Broken To Pass Criminal Justice Reform?” (Dec. 
22, 2015 12:15 PM), DAILY CALLER, http://dailycaller.com/2015/12/22/is-congress-too-
 32 
CONCLUSION 
 
[P]eople are no less prone to rehabilitation than corporations. Drug 
conspiracy defendants are no less deserving of a second-chance than 
bribery conspiracy defendants. And society is harmed at least as much by 
the devastating effect that felony convictions have on the lives of its 
citizens as it is by the effect of criminal convictions on corporations.140 
 
 The federal government’s reluctance to use deferred prosecution agreements—a 
pre-existing tool already structurally authorized by both Congress and the Department of 
Justice—to “provide the same opportunity to individual defendants to demonstrate their 
rehabilitation without triggering the devastating collateral consequences of a criminal 
conviction” is, to say the least, troubling.141  
 Congress’s intent in authorizing the federal use of DPAs was clear: In keeping 
with the history of DPAs as a means to resolve criminal offenses without unnecessarily 
"branding" certain categories of offenders, legislators modeled the agreements on 
programs that provided pretrial intervention alternatives for first-time, nonviolent 
defendants. The Department of Justice’s existing guidelines for the use of DPAs provide 
no limitation on prosecutors’ ability to use these tools for noncorporate criminal 
                                                                                                                                            
broken-to-pass-criminal-justice-reform/ (citing a poll in which 77% of respondents said 
they favored repealing mandatory minimum prison sentences for nonviolent drug 
offenders). 
139 See Nick Pinto, “Why Can’t We End Mass Incarceration?,” NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 
2015 6:11 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/why-cant-we-end-mass-incarceration-391881 
(describing the “sea change” in popular enthusiasm for mass incarceration and noting that 
a “bipartisan consensus” has coalesced around the need for reform).  
140 United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 2015 WL 6406266, at *29 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 
2015). 
141 Id. at *25. 
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defendants, despite the Department’s historical insistence on reserving them for resolving 
charges against our nation’s largest companies. As courts have begun to note, “increasing 
the use of deferred-prosecution agreements and other similar tools for individuals 
charged with certain non-violent criminal offenses could be a viable means to achieve 
reforms in our criminal justice system.”142 As such, both U.S. Attorneys and the broader 
Department of Justice should re-evaluate the use of these important tools in cases 
involving noncorporate criminal defendants.  
  
                                                
142 Id. at *21.  
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